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Abstract
Previous research shows that women are more altruist than men in dictator game ex-
periments. Yet, little is known whether women are expected to be more altruist than men.
Here we elicit third-parties’ beliefs about dictators’ donations conditional on knowing the
gender of the dictator. Our data provide evidence of three main findings: (i) women are
expected to be more altruist than men; (ii) both men and women have correct beliefs about
the level of altruism among men; and (iii) both men and women overestimate the level
of altruism among women. In doing so, our results uncover a perception gap according
to which, although women are more altruist than men, they are expected to be even more
altruist than they actually are.
Keywords: dictator game, expectations, accuracy of beliefs, gender differences.
1 Introduction
The exploration of gender differences in
decision making has a long tradition in be-
havioural economics and other social sci-
ences, and has touched several research ar-
eas, including risk-aversion, competitive be-
haviour, and social preferences.
For example, a classical study by Eckel
and Grossman (2002) has shown that women
are more risk averse than men, while an
equally classical study by Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007) has shown that women
are less competitive than men. In terms of
social preferences, results are more mixed:
while previous research has not uncovered
any obvious gender difference in cooperative
behaviour (see Croson and Gneezy (2009)
for a review), experimental studies have re-
peatedly found that women are, on average,
more altruist than men (Bolton and Katok
(1995); Eckel and Grossman (1998);
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001); Dufwenberg and Muren
(2006); Houser and Schunk (2009);
Dreber et al. (2014); Capraro and Marcelletti
(2014); Capraro (2015)). More recently,
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Rand et al. (2016) have extended this line
of research by showing, through a meta-
analysis of 22 studies, that promoting intu-
ition versus reflection increases altruistic be-
haviour among women, but not among men,
suggesting that women but not men have
internalised altruism as their spontaneous re-
action.
Other studies have shown that women
tend to be more altruistic than men when in-
vesting in human capital for children. For
example, women allocate more resources
for women’s and children’s clothing relative
to men’s clothing (Lundberg et al. (1997)),
invest more in health and nutrition for
children (Duflo (2000)), and spend more
on child goods and small scale livestock
(Rubalcava et al. (2009)) than men.
Despite the vast research in gender dif-
ferences, the literature has mostly neglected
the inverse question of whether people have
gender stereotypes in specific decisional
settings. Understanding whether people
have correct beliefs about others’ behaviour
is an important question per se, because
the standard equilibrium analysis assumes
that people strategise on their beliefs about
their counterparts’ behaviour (Camerer et al.
(2004)); and it becomes even more important
when it comes to gender differences, since
one of the dominant explanations for gender
differences in decision-making relies on the
assumption that the behaviour of men and
women is governed by stereotypes regard-
ing their social roles (Eagly (1987); Brescoll
(2011)). In sum, understanding whether
there is a correspondence between stereo-
types of men and women and their actual be-
haviour is an important question, with poten-
tial consequences in economic and psycho-
logical modelling.
Given the aforementioned literature
showing that women are more altruistic than
men, here we ask whether this gender dif-
ference in behaviour corresponds to a gender
difference in stereotypes. We move a first
step into this research area by starting from
a simple question: are women expected to be
more altruistic than men?
To the best of our knowledge, only a
handful of papers have approached this ques-
tion, and mostly did so from a psychologi-
cal perspective. For example, Heilman and
Chen (2005) showed that work-related altru-
ism is less optional for women than for men,
and Heilman and Okimoto (2007) showed
that penalties for women’s success in male
domains result from the perceived violation
of gender-stereotypic prescriptions. From an
economic perspective, we are aware of only
one study devoted to eliciting participants’
beliefs about the level of altruism in men
and women (Aguiar et al. (2009)). In this
lab experiment, subjects were presented with
two boxes, A and B, where A contained do-
nations left by men and B contained dona-
tions left by women. Subjects were informed
that they could choose only one of the two
boxes and one donation would be taken at
random from the selected box and used to
pay them. Results showed that subjects
were more likely to select donations from the
"women" box, indicating that women were
indeed expected to be more generous than
men.
Although it represents an important first
step towards understanding whether women
are expected to be more altruistic than men,
the work by Aguiar et al. (2009) has two
important limitations. First of all, while it
shows that women are expected to be more
generous than men, it does not show whether
people have correct beliefs about the be-
haviour of men and women. Thus, it remains
unclear whether people have correct stereo-
types regarding each gender’s level of altru-
ism. Second, it is only one study: the re-
cent outbreak of the replicability crisis (Open
Science Collaboration, 2015) calls for more
studies.
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In the current work, we wish to fill these
gaps by: (i) replicating the result that women
are expected to be more generous than men;
and (ii) giving a quantitative version of this
result. This allows to answer the question:
do men and women fulfil people’s expecta-
tions about altruistic behaviour?
The rest of the paper is organised as fol-
lows. Next section is devoted to methods;
section 3 focuses on results and discussion;
last section concludes.
2 Method
2.1 Subject pool
Subjects were living in the US at the time
of the experiment and were recruited using
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci et al.
(2010); Horton et al. (2011); Mason and Suri
(2012); Paolacci and Chandler (2014))
to play a standard Dictator Game
(Kahneman et al. (1986); Forsythe et al.
(1994)).
In the Dictator Game, one player acts
in the role of the dictator and the other
one in the role of the receiver. Dictators
are given a certain amount of money and
are asked how much, if any, they want to
give to the receiver. Receivers have no
choice and only get what the dictators de-
cide to give. Since dictators have no in-
centives to give money, a payoff-maximising
dictator would donate nothing. For this
reason, dictators’ donations are taken as
a measure of individual’s altruism, or in-
equity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999);
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Brañas-Garza
(2006, 2007); Charness and Gneezy (2008)).
2.2 Protocol
In our experiment, subjects were randomly
divided between dictators and receivers.
Dictators: They were given $0.20 and were
asked to decide how much, if any, to give
to the receiver. Before making their deci-
sion, dictators were asked two comprehen-
sion questions. Specifically, they were asked
which choice would maximise their payoff
and which choice would maximise the re-
ceiver’s payoff. Subjects failing any com-
prehension question were automatically ex-
cluded from the survey. This screening pro-
cedure had the effect that we had fewer dic-
tators (N = 456) than receivers (N = 530).
Thus, the computation of receivers’ payoffs
is not straightforward, since there is no one-
to-one correspondence between dictators and
receivers. To address this problem, receivers
were sequentially paired with a randomly se-
lected dictator; in case a dictator was already
used to pay another receiver, we paid the
current recipient ‘out of our pocket’, and not
using the donation of that dictator, because
that donation had already been used. This
procedure is doable on Amazon Mechanical
Turk, because participants are matched only
after the end of the experiment.
Receivers: A part from potentially receiving
money from dictators, receivers played also
as guessers. Specifically, they were asked
to predict the donation that another dicta-
tor would make to another receiver. They
would receive, on top of the actual dona-
tion, $0.20 reward for correct guesses. Since
they do not guess their own donation there is
no opportunity to hedge (Brañas-Garza et al.
(2016)). To elicit recipients’ expectations,
we designed four treatments:
On: recipients were presented with the
same screenshots shown to dictators
and they were asked to guess the dic-
tator’s decision (N = 134);
Omow: was identical to On with the only dif-
ference that recipients were informed
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that the dictator was either a man or a
woman (N = 140).
Om: was identical to On with the only dif-
ference that recipients were informed
that the dictator was a man (N = 124);
Ow: was identical to Om with the only dif-
ference that recipients were informed
that the dictator was a woman (N =
132).
We need both On and Omow baselines for
two reasons: on the one hand, by comparing
Om and Ow with Omow, separately, we may
investigate the effect of making one partic-
ular gender salient versus making both gen-
ders salient; on the other hand, by comparing
dictators’ donations with On, we can explore
whether people have correct beliefs about the
level of altruism in anonymous strangers.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive statistics
A total of 986 subjects (56% men, mean age
= 34.5 years) participated in our experiment.
The average donation was 27.3% of the to-
tal endowment, which is very close to the
average donation reported in Engel’s meta-
analysis of 616 Dictator game experiments
conducted in the standard physical labora-
tory (28.3%, Engel (2011)). This confirms
the reliability of data collected on Amazon
Mechanical Turk using very small stakes, a
fact that was already observed in the con-
text of the Dictator Game by d’Adda et al.
(2015). Although the pie size was $0.20 data
are normalised such that the donations corre-
spond to 0-10. Next we pass to the analysis
of treatment effects.
3.2 Gender framed vs non-
framed treatments
As a preliminary step we start by looking at
framing effects on recipients’ beliefs. Both
treatments On and Omow report similar aver-
ages (2.79 and 3.16, resp.). Table 1 shows no
significant differences between On and Omow
(t-test, p = 0.24; z-test, p = 0.23). Sim-
ilarly, we do not find significant differences
between Om ∪ Ow and Omow (t-test, p = 0.89;
z-test, p = 0.84). Hence, the sum of ‘men’
and ‘women’ frames is equal to the treatment
in which ‘both’ genders are mentioned.
Therefore, we may conclude that men-
tioning ‘gender’ does not frame recipients
expectations.
3.3 Are women expected to be
more generous than men?
To answer this question we compare treat-
ment Om with Omow and treatment Ow with
Omow. Figure 1 shows the distribution of be-
liefs by treatment. Figures 1a, 1b and 1c
show the histograms for Om, Omow and Ow,
respectively. While the modal values for ex-
pected behavior of males is 0 (giving noth-
ing) the modal for women (i.e., Ow) and,
to a lesser extent, for women or men (i.e.,
Omow) is the equal split. Average values re-
flect the same result: the mean expected al-
truism in Om is 2.33, while the mean for Omow
is 3.18 (t-test, p = 0.01; z-test, p = 0.01).
Conversely, when the dictator is a ‘woman’,
the mean expected generosity in Ow is 4.05,
which is significantly larger than the mean
for Omow (t-test, p = 0.01; z-test, p = 0.00).
Comparing the expected level of generosity
among males and females, Ow vs Om, we
observe than the average and median differ-
ences are 1.72 and 4 units, respectively. The
top part of Table 1 shows the relevant tests.
Figure 1a to Figure 1c provide visual ev-
idence that we can reject the hypothesis that
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men are expected to be as altruistic as the av-
erage person and that women are expected to
be as altruistic as the average person.
Figure 1d focuses on the CDFs (cumu-
lative distribution functions). While males’
CDF is closer to the top right – more selfish
– Females CDF is closer to the bottom left
–more generous. It is easy to check that Ow
stocastically dominates Om which is consis-
tent with the test shown in Table 1. The entire
distribution of Ow is always toward the right
of the rest of distributions. In sum, women
are expected to me more altruistic than men.
Result 1 Women are expected to be more al-
truistic than men.
3.4 Are women actually more
generous than men?
In the previous subsection, we have shown
that women are expected to be more altru-
istic than men in a Dictator Game. Is this
expectation grounded or not?
Figure 2a and Figure 2b respectively
compare the distribution of donations for
both men and women, and provides visual
evidence that women are, on average, more
altruist than men (means: 3.04 vs 2.49; t-
test, p = 0.03; z-test, p = 0.01). In fact,
giving nothing is the modal value for males
(49.6% gave 0) while giving the equal split
is the modal value for women (48.3% gave
half).
In sum, not only women are expected to
be more generous than men, but they are de
facto more generous than men.
Result 2 Women are more altruistic than
men.
3.5 Do subjects have correct be-
liefs about each gender’s av-
erage level of generosity?
In the previous subsections, we have shown
that women are expected to be more altru-
istic than men and that this expectation is
grounded, in the sense that women are actu-
ally more altruistic than men. Now, we ask
whether people have correct beliefs about
each gender’s average level of generosity.
We begin by observing that subjects
have, on average, correct beliefs about the
average level of altruism. Specifically, the
mean level of altruism across the experiment
(both males and females) is 2.735, while the
mean level of expected generosity in the On
condition is 2.798 (t-test, p = 0.81; z-test,
p = 0.83), see Table 1 bottom). Hence sub-
jects have correct beliefs about average level
of generosity, which in turn means that we
do not observe either wishful thinking or pes-
simism.
Next we analyse whether subjects have
correct beliefs about men’s average level of
altruism. Figures 3a analyses accuracy of be-
liefs for men and shows that there is no dis-
crepancies since both expectations and actual
behavior are almost identical (CDFs are on
parallel).
Controlling for the gender of the recipi-
ent, we also find that both men and women
have, on average, correct beliefs about men’s
level of altruism (t-test, guess by men p =
0.21 and guess by women p = 0.60; z-test,
guess by men p = 0.22 and guess by women
p = 0.44, see Table 1 bottom).
Result 3 Both men and women have correct
beliefs about average level of generosity in
men.
However Figure 3b shows strong discrep-
ancies between current behaviour and expec-
tations for women: females are not as gen-
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erous as they are expected to be (Ow CDF
dominates the Dw CDF).
This remains true also after controlling
for gender. Both men and women overes-
timate women’s average level of generosity
(t-test, both p-values < 0.03; z-test, both p-
values < 0.02, see Table 1).
Result 4 Both men and women overestimate
the level of generosity in women.
Table 1: Hypothesis testing
Hypothesis Parametric Tests Non-Parametric Tests
Difference T-test P-Value Difference Z-tests P-value
in Means in Medians
On= Omow -0.38 -1.17 0.24 -2 -1.19 0.23
Om ∪ Ow = Omow 0.04 0.14 0.89 0 0.20 0.84
Om = Omow -0.85 -2.58 0.01 -4 -2.59 0.01
Ow = Omow 0.87 2.77 0.01 0 2.89 0.00
Om = Ow 1.72 5.50 0.00 4 5.51 0.00
D= On -0.06 -0.25 0.81 0 -0.22 0.83
Dm = Omm 0.44 1.26 0.21 1 1.24 0.22
Dm = Owm -0.20 -0.53 0.60 -1 -0.78 0.44
Dw = Omw -0.81 -2.25 0.03 0 -2.28 0.02
Dw = Oww -1.27 -3.92 0.00 0 -3.57 0.00
Dw = Dm 0.55 2.21 0.03 4 2.36 0.02
Note: t-tests assume unequal variances per treatment and normality of the distribution of
differences in means; z-tests correspond to Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon non-parametric tests.
Dm (Dw) refers to men (women) dictators; D to any dictator.
4 Conclusion
Here we have used Dictator Game ex-
periments to measure people’s expectations
about dictators’ level of generosity, condi-
tional on knowing the gender of the dicta-
tor. Our data provide evidence of three major
results: (i) women are expected to be more
generous than men (replicating Aguiar et al.
(2009) results); (ii) both men and women
have correct beliefs about the mean level of
generosity among men; (iii) both men and
women overestimate the level of generosity
among women.
In doing so, our experiment uncovers a
perception gap according to which, although
women are more altruist than men, they are
expected to be even more altruistic than they
actually are. This result is particularly puz-
zling since it regards also women: while
women have correct beliefs about the level of
altruism in men, they overestimate the level
of altruism in other women.
We hope that future research can shed
light on the ultimate origin of this percep-
tion gap and on the potential psychological
and economic consequences that can have on
women’s and men’s behaviour.
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Figure 1: Expected behavior for men, women and both
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Figure 2: Actual behaviour: men vs women
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Figure 3: Accuracy of beliefs: Expected vs actual behaviour
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